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WAR AND LAW.*
creates rights. It not merely defines them; it creates them.
L AWthat
Without law, one may what he can. With law, one can only
which he may. Law is the device by which the many,
individually weak, control and compel the few individually strong
or cunning. It is a device by which is reduced nature's handicap in
favor of the physically strong and ruthless. Where law obtains,
those who are fitted to the system created by the law, as the economically efficient, prevail and survive. In the absence of law, only
the strong and cunning can survive.
War is the logical expression of physical force. It is the negation
of peace between nations, as law is the assertion of peace between
individuals. International law, to be sure, theoretically contemplates
and provides for war within the law; but the present struggle persuades that this is hardly more than sterile theory.
A gathering of lawyers, intent upon the science of their calling at
a time when nearly all the so-called civilized world is at war, is,
therefore, an anomaly, unless the prevalence of war prompts them
again to search for and test the foundations of their science.
Only because international law is primitive and in it, therefore,
we may discover perhaps more easily than in the more complex and
finished product of municipal law some of the fundamental concepts·
of jurisprudence, and not at all because I have any peculiar learning
in that branch of our science, I wish to call to your attention some
modern views as to what are the fundamental concepts of international law. For this purpose, I shall contrast an American view,
as expressed in the Declaration of Rights and Duties of Nations,
adopted by the American Institute of International La_w; a French
view, as expressed by Antoine Fillet, a member of the faculty of law
•An address delivered before the Minnesota State Bar Association on August 9, 1917.
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in the University of Paris, and a German view, as expressed by Dr.
Joseph Kohler, Privy Councillor and Professor in the University of
Berlin. After these I shall be so bold as to suggest a theory, in
part, at least, my own.
The American Institute of International Law consists of five delegates chosen by the Societies of International Law of each of the
twenty-one republics in the Western Hemisphere. it is not official,
but exists with the approval of each of the governments. At the
first meeting of the Institute, held in Washington, beginning on December 29, 1915, there was adopted the Deelaration of Rights and
Duties of Nations, as follows:
"WHEREAS, The municipal law of civilized nations recognizes and
protects the right to life, the right to liberty, the right to the pursuit
of happiness, as added by the Declaration of Independence of the
United States of America, the right to legal equality, the right to
property, and the right to the enjoyment of the aforesaid rights; and
"WHEREAS, These fundamental rights, thus universally recognized, create a duty on the part of the peoples of all nations to observe them; and
"WHEREAS, According to the political philosophy of the Declaration of Independence of the United States, and· the universal practice of the American Republics, nations or governments are regarded
as created by the people, deriving their just powers from the consent
of the governed, and are instituted among men to promote their
safety and happiness and to secure to the people the enjoyment of
their fundamental rights; and
"WHEREAS, The nation is a moral or juristic person, the creature
of law, and subordinated to law as is the natural person in political
society ; and
"WHEREAS, We deem that these fundamental rights can be stated
in terms of international law and applied to the relations of the
members of the society of nations, one with another, just as they
have been applied in the relations of the citizens or subjects of the
states forming the Society of Nations; and
"WHEREAS, These fundamental rights of national jurisprudence,
namely, the right to life, the right to liberty, the right to the pursuit
of happiness, the right to equality before the law, the right to property, and the right to the observance thereof are, when stated in
terms of international law, the right of the nation to exist and to
protect and to conserve its existence; the right of independence and
the freedom to develop itself without interference or control from
other nat!ons; the right of equality in law and before law; the right ·
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to territory within defined boundaries and to exclusive jurisdiction
therein; and the right to the observance of these fundamental rights;
and
"WHEREAS, The rights and the duties of nations are, by virtue of
:m,embership in the society thereof, to be exercised and performed in
accordance with the exigencies of their mutual interdependence expressed in the preamble to the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of the First and Second Hague
Peace Conferences, recognizing the solidarity which unites the members of the society of civilized nations;
"Therefore, The American Institute of International Law, at its
first session, held in the City of Washington, in the United States
of America, on the sixth day of January, 1916, adopts the following
six articles, together with the commentary thereon, to be known as
its Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations:
"I. Every nation has the right to exist, and to protect and to
conserve its existence; but this right neither implies the right nor
justifies the act of the state to protect itself or to conserve its existence by the commission of unlawful acts against innocent and unoffending states.
"II. Every nation has the right to independence in the sense
that it has a right to the pursuit of happiness and is free to develop
itself without interference or control from other states, provided
that in so doing it does not interfere with or violate the rights of
other states.
"III. Every nation is in law and before law the equal of every
other nation belonging to the society of nations, and all nations have
the right to claim and, according to the Declaration of Independence
of the United States, 'to assume, among the powers of the earth,
the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of
nature's God entitle them.'
"IV. Every nation has the right to territory within defined
boundaries and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over its territory,
and all persons whether native or foreign found therein.
"V. Every nation entitled to a right by the law of nations is
entitled to have that right respected and protected by all other nations, for right and duty are correlative, and the right of one is the
duty of all to observe.
"VI. International law is at one and the same time both national
and international; national in the sense that it is the law of the land
and applicable as such to the decision of all questions involving its
principles ; international in the sense that it is the law of the society
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-of nations and applicable as such to· all questions between and among
the members of the society of nations ·involving its principles." 1
In this announcement there is nol\e of the hesitancy of over-refinement; but, if it lacks in scientific nicety, jt is youthful, buoyant
and hopeful. It has in it the same ring of noble purpose which
stirs our hearts when we read the Declaration of Independence.
The captious may cavil and challenge the authors to state whence
they derive these ideas of nation~l rights. The historical scholar
may point out the many fallacies into which writers have fallen by
pressing too close the analogy between a nation and an individual,
and argue that ·these declarants have not escaped that pitfall, but
despite all scientific criticism, mankind will read this declaration as
we, for _the past one hundred and forty years, have read the Declaration of Independence, and feel in their hearts a noble aspiration
toward world-unity, sympathy and justice. It is the challenge
thrown to the world by Democracy-self-respecting and regardful
of others' rights, courageous and generous. It is not only a challenge-it is an invitation to the rest of the world to join in a peaceful and well-ordered international life. The democracies of the
American continent are horrified by war, but they stand undismayed
and unafraid.
In an article published in the June number of the Yale Law J ournal, entitled "Some Observations on the Private International Law
of the Future," translated by Dr. Ernest G. Lorenzen, Professor of
Law in the University of Minnesota, Antoine Fillet, a distinguished
professor in the University of Paris, treats of two questions or private international law-the status of aliens and the conflict of laws.
The two questions treated are perhaps foreign to our present inquiry, but expressions of the learned author, as he develops his subject, make vivid to our understanding, in contrast with the American
point of view, the despairing attitude of the French scholar. He
says:
''I regard it as certain that the end of the war will bring about a
noticeable rapprochement 'between certain nations which have remained; heretofore, very distant toward each other. Is it necessary
for me to indicate here that I do not mean to allude to any plan
whatsoever for the reconstruction of society on a rational basis?
The persons who do me the honor of reading these lines well know
that I regard all projects of this sort as so many idle fancies which
cannot be realized. The contemporaneous events since and inclusive
of The Hague Conferences, have only confirmed these views. * * *
1

X Am. Jour. ·of Int. !;aw,

124.
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Since the middle of the nineteenth century, the period in which the
first of the new doctrines of Private International Law came to·
light, their development has been in the direction of an almost unlimited cosmopolitanism. L was assumed that the mission of this
science was not only to aid in the good administration of private
justice among the nations, but that it should lower also, by degrees,
the barriers separating subjects from aliens, so as to make of all
inhabitants of the civilized countries one people, with a view to subjecting them gradually to the same institutions. Hence, the tendency to favor changes of nationality; hence the avowed determination to suppress all differences in the civil status of aliens and subjects; hence, also, the growing frequency of those great conventions
which aim to establish, to an appreciable extent, uniformity of legislation.
"We believed that progress was to be found in that direction. We
all shared, more or less, this mistake, and I am well aware that there
are pages in my writings to which I would no longer subscribe. One
painful experience has undeceived us. We committed the two-fold
mistake of thinking that the juridical consequences attached to the
idea of .nationality could be weakened without danger and of failing
to see that the same regime of law does not equally suit all nations.
We now know that a people grows stronger by birth and not by naturalization. Equality between subjects and aliens is with us no
longer a dogma. The great conventions have not justified the high
hopes reposed in them. The spirit of cosmopolitanism is therefore
dead. Warned by experience, the people will be resolutely nationalists. They will live by themselves knowing that by seeking too
much foreign collaboration they incur the nsk of ending in servitude."
Later, in discussing the embarrassments of the tribunal called on
to decide a question of a conflict of laws, he says :
"And this (difficulty) will remain so as long as the international
society, which has been promised to us so often, has not been organized; and it will never be organized."2
These are the expressions of a man who has witnessed the war
not from afar, but whose ears have been deafened by the thunder
of the enemy's guns at the gates of his own beloved city. To the
Frenchman, however scholarly he may be, however valiantly he
may struggle to preserve his scientific objectivity, a theory of international society that contemplates close co-operation between France
and Germany is abhorrent. His scholarship may avail to resist the
2

XXVI Yale Law Jour. 631, 633, 638.
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temptation to revile the enemy, but his soul cries out-"the spirit
of cosmopolitanism is dead".
In Ig09, only five years before the war broke out, Dr. Joseph
Kohler, Professor in the University of Berlin and a Privy Councillor, published the great work which has been translated as Volume
I2 of the Modem Legal Philosophy Series, under the title of, "The
Philosophy of Law". Speaking of the distinguished author, Dr.
Roscoe Pound has referred to him as "the first of living jurists,"
adding:
,
"No orte else has come so heat to taking all legal knowledge for
his province. No one, therefore, is so well prepared to reduce all
legal knowledge to a system."3
The fast book of this work treats of international law with a
vision so clear artd a scholarship so profound that one reading it
would surely think its author would, in all events, preserve his scierttific attitude, observe phenomena dispassionately and bring to
bear upon the observed phenomena the cold, clear light of reason.
Contrast, then, with what was to be expected, an article written by
this same author and published in September, I9I5, in the "Zeitzschrift Fiir Volkerrecht". A translation by J. S. Reeves, a professor in the College of Literature, Science, and the Arts of the University of Michigan, under the title, "The New La'v of NatiC?ns,"
appeared in the June number of this year of the MICHIGAN LAw
R:svn:w. After commenting upon the efforts made during the preceding centttry, especially by the Hague '.Peace Conferences, to enrich international law by treaties artd to organize to some degree the
international community, Dr. Kohler says :
"This phantasmagoria of a family of nations which would dictate
the norms of International Law and by judicial methods decide international disputes, so that only exceptionally and here and there
.the structure of the international community would be convulsed by
war-all that is far behind us. Twelve months only have passed,
but they divide us from all that has gone before as if years had
intervened. The occurrences of the past year have accomplished.
more than decades. The Hague Peace Conferences were dreams
of peace which have burst like bubbles and the Peace Palace at the
Hague can appropriately open its halls for other praiseworthy aims
of mankind. •
"We also were enthralled by these illusions, and we are frank
enough to confess, if we are rebuked for being unpractical and shorts The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence,
face to the Philosophy of Law-XV-XVI.

xss,

quoted in editorial pre-
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sighted for doing so, t,hat it was our honorablf! German nature
which permitted us to overlook cunning and weakness; it was our
belief in mankind which led us and the thought that at least a spark
of our German idealism was to be found among other peoples. We
fully believed that we had to do w1th civiliz~d peoples, who, like us,
were constantly striving to solve the greatest problems of humanity.
We assumed that every nation had its o,... n task
the furtherance
of culture. We believed that the world was big enough so that all
nations in furthering their own interests would by straight-forward
intercourse increase the spiritual assets of the entire world. This
illusion was a huge deception of race psychology, but it was the deception of i:. man of bonor who falls into the gnp cf a cunning
band; such an error honors him who errs, and loyalty to a mistaken
morality raises him who is thus deceived giant-high above the reptile
which crawls about him.
"Then we became clear-visioned. The German Siegfried, who
has never learned to know fear, is awakened at the right moment.
Just as Siegfried once understood the speech of birds, so now we
recognize in the buzzing and tumult of the world-strife the true soul
of our opponents, and the dragon of cunning, lies, and slander is
stretched beneath our victorious sword. The noble myth of our
people has become a reality.
"An International Law based on international treaties can no
longer be. International association can only lead to norms of law
if the peoples are actuated by legal endeavors. Treaties with liars
and falsifiers cannot form sources of law; only those peoples can
co-operate in the development of law who have a living conscience.
Shall we recognize as brother nations having kindred conceptions of
justice those like the French-a nation of bragging tricksters, who
drench us with most miserable abuse and outrageous slander-or a
perfidious company of peddlers, like the English, who from the first
day of the war have flooded the world with statements which they
knew to be calumnies and lies-a nation whose government did not
hesitate, like bandits following the fashion of Caesar Borgia, to undertake sneaking bribery in order to get rid of a Roger Casement?
Or a nation of barbarians, like the Russians, whose excesses in East
Prussia have suddenly brought before our eyes the whole Muscovite
brutality? Or the Italians, among whom a miserable lottery-playing
group made up of the immature and half-educated proletariat, and
of phrase-drunken demagogues, could bring the government to violate sacred treaties, and to fall upon the flank of their sworn allies?
No, and thrice, No! These ties are forever broken. And as for
neutrals, the United States, glorying in an empty play of moral plat-

in
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itudes with the blessing of the Vanderbilt-Morgan millions, has
done enough injury to us with its munitions policy. Neutral states
like Spain, Switzerland, and Sweden will always appear to us dear
and worthy. On the other hand, a portion of the press of Holland,
Norway, and Denmark l).as wounded us sorely by its unjust treatm~nt of us. ,And Holland has perimaded herself, by putting her
trade under English control to further England's war of starvation!
In all these circumstances these peoples can never be bound with us
into an Areopagus wherein every state works with even justice in
·order to lay down for the world the statutes of the Law of Nations."4
With ¢is learned and scientific introduction, this German scholar
proceeds, if I understand his thought, ambushed as it is in clouded
sentences, to develop the thesis that international law is to be derived by a process of induction applied in the light of the law of
evolution to observed international phenomena. And he boldly
maintains that only the trained, scientific minds of Germans can
suffice; that only in Germany can be found those of adequate scientific attainments to make true observations or draw correct conclusions. From this it would seem to follow that the rest of the woild
is bound to await the announcements of German scholars for the
rules of international law. His modest reason for this astounding
position is the superior scientific attainments of the Germans, but
the practical result is, of course, that Germany is to make and declare the rules which shall govern all inter-state relations. There
remains only one step and that this exalted scholar fears not to take.
If Gentlan sch9lars are to announce rules of international law withoµt the help of other European or American jurists and without the
consent of other nations, obviously there will be required means to
enforce the rules so declared. But this consideration has no terrors
for this German sage, for, as he fears not to say, "This is German
science, for German science alone has been able to work in systematic fashion," so he fears not also to say, "The claim is often made
that thete is no International 1,aw because it is trampled under foot
by our enemies. This is as erroneous as it would be to assert that
the:re is no municipal law because at the present time one might be
liable to be robbed by the banditti of the Italian Abruzzi, or assaulted by the Parisian apaches, or by the Milanese rabble. Naturally, International Law needs its sanction just as every branch
of law does, but we shall, as I hope, be so vastly fortified by our
victorious war that we can undertake the protection of International
'XV Mich. Law Rev. 631, 635-6. ·
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Law just as centuries ago the Lombard Dante invoked the German
Emperor as the protector of law and the shield of justice." 5
These are not the ravings of a defeated military chieftain, they are
not the outpourings of an over-emotionalized actor nor the hysterica1 outcry of a grief-stricken mother, but the solemn, scientific, precise statements of a learned German scholar in a scientific journal
of world-wide reputation. Consider how profound must be the
influence of war which can jolt a philosopher into the utterance of
such grotesquenes. Nearly three hundred years earlier, Hugo Grotius, the father of international law, maintained that "certain laws,
of which fidelity to plighted word is the most important, are therefore as immutable as human nature," 6 but this modern German professor of international law boasts of the honorable nature and idealism of a nation which calls a solemn treaty a scrap of pq.per. No
wonder he says that international law based on internatiGmal treaties
can no longer be and that treaties with liars and falsifiers cannot
form sources of law. If he remembers that t.he German chancellor
expressed surprise that England should ente1· the war, although five
days before England did so the directors of the North GermanLloyd Steamship company wired thP. master of one of their vessels
that Germany was already at war with England, no wonder he calls
the English perfidious !1 And who but a German student of inter~
national law could be shocked by Muscovite brutality while shutting
his ears to the cries of murdered women and children in Belgium
and turning his prophetic eyes from the four hundred thousanci
refugees ,,.ho have since died by a roadside in Poland, their wasted
flesh a food for crows, their stripped bones g<:tihered for fertilizer
by their thrifty, ghoulish conquerors ?8 No wonder the moral platitudes of America plague his con.science. To what apologist for
murder has any expression of morality ever sounded as ought but
platitude? If such an abdication of the throne of reason does not
persuade us that Cardinal Newman was nght in his contention that
the pursuit of civilization is not enough, it would seem to make ap• lb. p. 638.
•Studies of Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius, by John N. Figgis, p. 88."0n this subject we are supplied with noble arguments from the divine oracles, which
inform us, that God himself, who can be limited by no established rules of law, would
act contrary to his own nature, if he did not perform his promises. From whence 1t
follows that the obligations to perform promises spring from the nature of that un·
changeable justice, which is an attribute of God, and common to all who bear his
image, in the use of reason." "The Rights of War and Peace," translated from the
original Latin of Grotius by A. C. Campbell, University Classics Library, p. 134•
•The Kronprinzessin Cecilie, 244 U. S. u.
• Report of Frederic C. Walcott of the Rockefeller Foundation, Nat. Geographic
Mag., June, 1917.
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plicable to the philosophers and literati of twentieth century Germany the words written in 1796 by Burke of the political philosophers of the Frenc;h Revolution:
"Never before this time, was a set of literary men converted into
a gang of robbers and assassins. Never before did a den of bravos
and banditti assume the garb and tone of an academy of philos•
ophers." 9
•
Would that he could have truly prophesied that this hideous masquerade should never again offend· our ey..:s 1.
'1.'hese three different views of the fundamentals of international
law .. different as they are, all assume or assert the sovereignty of the
state. But a system of law cannot be built upon the theory that
those affected by the law are completely sovereign, for to the extent
that the law does compel them, they cease to be absolutely sovereign.
The only possible path to a richer field of international law leads
through the broken wall of complete sovereignty.
During the middle ages, the theory prevailed that the world was
one, as controlled either by the Roman Empire or by the Christian
Church, and international relations were hardly apprehended. With
the growth of the great powers, however, came the necessity for
some rules to regulate their relations, and international law gradually grew up under the dominion of strong, national feeling, a feeling which was in part the cause, and in part the effect, of the national development.
·
A moment's reflection will explain the strength of this group feeling. The bees and the ants have their community life, which they
preserve by co-operation. So far as we know, the power that fits
the individual bee or ant into his community life is instinct. Perhaps the greatest in the series of steps of evolution was the birth of
self-consciousness which made the individual realize himself as an
individual and led him to ratiocinate on his relations to his community. Man ·differs from the ant perhaps more in this than in shape
or size. Among primitive men, the struggle for existence, the competition for food and other necessities of life, arrayed each group
in antagonism to every other. Only that group could survive which
was coherent, and cohesion could only exist as each member was
devoted to the other members of his own group and loyal to the
whole. Within the primitive group there was in some measure discipline, law, order and peace, and without there was war. By this
very arrangement of primitive society, war and peace interacted
on each other, the existence of war outside the group making neces•A Letter to a Noble Lord.
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sary peace within and peace within fitting it to protect itself against
war from without.10 When two hostile clans or tribes of primitive
men fought for the possession of a good hunting-ground, there was
only the question of which of two groups of equally worthy or
worthless men should have more food, though all of the men engaged doubtless felt themselves to be patriots and entitled to the
plaudits of their fellows. Patriotism, as a conscious emotion, originated, therefore, in the instinct of self-preservation or of grouppreservation. It was a biological necessity and therefore a moral
virtue. And this primitive biological necessity or virtue has had
incalculable potency in the development of our modem states and
the formation of the rules which have been accepted as regulating
the relations between them. It has availed in the past, under many
pretexts of right, sometimes to instigate to aggression, in order
that the group might be strengthened in territory or power, and
again it has armed the hand for defense to protect that which the
group already had. Whenever contests of force arise between
groups, be they small clans or tribes or great nations, this instinctive
patriotism revives and motivates the great mass of men who respond
quickly to primitive emotions.
Nationalities, however, dearly as we cherish them, are, after all,
but instrumentalities of human progress. The instinctive patriotism which commands not only unwavering but enthusiastic devotion
of each man to his own country, has its biological and historical justification in the creation of these great instrumentalities. But do
not a wider vision and a profounder insight into the destinies of
man on earth and a deeper sympathy with the purposes of social
order lead to the conclusion that without the destruction of national
existence, there shall grow up between civilized nations a far stronger bond than has heretofore existed? Has not primitive patriotism
evolved among educated men from an unreasoning instinct as an
aid in preserving the group to an intellectual and moral devotion to
ideals of government-national and international? Most of the
Americans living today have never had occasion to feel the patriotism which arouses them to defend their country and far less have
they felt the patriotism that drives to aggression. Within.the memory of most of the present generation, there has been only the opera
bouffe war with Spain in 1898, which only for a moment gave a
tingle to our natipnal nerves. And yet we are not wanting in patriotism, a patriotism, I believe, of a higher kind. Even the immigrant, newly come to our shores, feels a devotion, which he would
10

Cf. Folkways, by W. G. Sumner, §§

13·20.

12

lffICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

himself be at a loss to explain, to the institutions of freedom whose
shelter he has sought. We read our Declaration of Independence
with its outworn eighteenth century philosophy and thrill and thrill
again with love of our country, conceived in such noble resolve, and
we repeat the pregnant phrases of our bills of right and glory that
we are citizens of a country dedicated to liberty. Our emotional
response, too, finds its confirmation in our sober moments of reason.
We may be persuaded that the eighteenth century doctrine of natural rights, which inspired our forefathers and has guided much of
our constitutional development, has no foundation in reason, but so
also are we persuaded that pragmatically tested, the doctrine of in- .
dividual liberty, however suspicious may have been its source, has
worked. and we believe that while man remains at once a lazy animal, requiring incentive to labor, and also a liberty-loving spirit
scorning servitude, it will continue to work. It was an expansion
of this higher and nobler spirit of patriotism into the international
field which, I surmise, induced the five United States members of
the American Institute of International Law to give their adherence
to the six propositions which I first read. This patriotism is something more than historical or biological. It has a moral or spiritual
content. It does not assert that Americans are better than other
people. It does not assert that American institutions must be imposed upon other people. It does not assert that America must
declare the norms of international law and enforce observance thereof. No, our patriotism is neither vainglorious nor selfish. The
priceless boon of liberty which our hearts desire and our intellects
approve we want not only for ourselves-we should rejoice to see
it the. heritage of every man in every land. Ours is a devotion to
an ideal!
By this I do not mean that we Americans are superior to other
people in having a higher form of patriotism. If we were attacked
in such a way that our people were persuaded that their lands would
be devastated, their h9mes destroyed, their wives and children murdered and that a conqueror would, at the close of war, dominate our
country so that as a native walked the street, .he would have to
salute a foreign officer at each comer, we should feel the same savage patriotism which today fills the breast of every Belgian and
Frenchman. I am talking now rather of this sentiment of patriotism in the American mind in times of peace. But if our patriotism
be indeed a loyalty to a political ideal, if it be not only free from
envy but instinct with charity, it should prompt in us the hope that
the country we so love shall lead in the march toward international
ideals.
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It is not necessary now to discuss differences between scholars as
to the bases of international law; suffice it to note that recognized
rules have grown up as customary law, supplemented by specific
agreements and treaties; and, as has been suggested, to the extent
that the customs have prevailed between equals, they are evidence of
agreements, so, it may be said, all international law is founded in
agreement. Most questions between nations are discussed as questions arising between individuals and governed by rules analogous
to those of municipal law. Because there has been no superstate to
enforce law, or against which offenses could be committed, all the
analogies have been those of civil law and there has been no such
thing as international criminal law. A state can have a claim against
another state or a national of one state can have a claim against another state and these claims may sound in contract or it tort, but
no state can be indicted or convicted for a felony or misdemeanor.
The suggestion I wish to leave with you today is that this is in
process of change and the entrance of the United States into the
present great war on the side of Great Britain and her allies may be
the unconscious beginning of an international criminal law.11 Bear
in mind that systems of jurisprudence grow up out of custom, beginning in a single act done, ordinarily, in entire unconsciousness by
the actor that he is determining future law. In discussing questions
of international law, we are, perforce, driven to analogy, but we
must use analogies always conscious of their danger. The Declaration of the American Institute of International Law has been criticized by careful students as failing to observe this caution and pressing too close the analogy between states and private persons.12 Probably many fallacies have their origin in this analogy. Perhaps a closer
analogy is to be found in the relations of corporations, but a still
closer one is to be found in societies in which there are local groups
of more or less coherenct!, joined together in a loose organization;
and perhaps the best known example of such an organization is to
be found in the history of early England.
Up to the time of Edward I. at least, the organization under the
king was loose. There were hundreds, towns, lords of the manordifferent groups, in a large measure independent of each other and
owing varying degrees of allegiance to the king. For instance, the
conclusion of the ordinary indictment "against the peace and dignity of our lord, the king," was originally no idle form, but a juris11 Opening Address of Elihu Root, Pres't Am. Soc. Int. Law, Dec. 28, 1915; 10 Am.
Jour Int. Law, 1, 7-9.
22 The Analogy between Natural Persons and International Persons in the Law of
Nations, by Edwin DeWitt Dickinson, XXVI Yale L. Jour. 564.
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dictional averment which must be proved. The king's peace did
not extend to all parts of the realm nor equally to all people, nor did
it prevail at all times. One man might be within tpe king's peace
and an assault upon him was "against the peace and dignity of our
lord, the king," while a similar assault upon another man at the
same time and place might not be a violation of the king's peace. ·So
our common expression, "the king's highway,'' originated in the
days in England when there were four highways within the king's
peace, so that an assault committed upon a traveler on one of them
was against the peace of the king, while an assault committed one
hundred yards away was not.13
I am not unmindful that there is a distinction between federal law
and int~rnational law and to the extent that law becomes federal it
may be said to cease to be international.14 And yet analogies between federal and international law, or between the rules governing
groups in a loose organization and those in international law, are
illuminating. In this early society in England, violence was common; homicides and robbery were everyday occurrences. The central authority was hopelessly inadequate for the security of the
individual and the stranger had little or no protection from the
members of the community in which he was attacked. The man
who traveled, therefore, from one part of England to another, took
his life in his hands. To remedy this, the central authorities sought
to impose financial liability upon the hundred or the county which
suffered an offense without apprehending aJ?.d punishing the felon,
and the rule grew up, known as the "hue and cry." Under this rule,
which probably existed at first by virtue of custom and was afterwards incorporated in statute, if one were assaulted, he could seek
out a constable, whose duty it was then to raise a hue and cry, and
it was the duty of all within hearing to join with the constable inthe pursuit of the felon. Not only this, if the victim could not locate
a constable, he could himself raise a hue and cry and it was equally
the duty of those within hearing to respond to his call and join with
him in the pursuit of the felon, and if one did not respond to the
call and do his duty in helping to apprehend the culprit he was himself punishable, nor was he liable for manslaughter or murder for
killing a resisting offender.15
1! The King's Peace, O"ford Lectures and Other Discourses, by Sir Frederick Pol·.
lock (Macmillan, 1890) p. 65.
:u Elements of Jurisprudence, T. E. Holland, p. 333.
15 :z Hale's Pleas of the Crown (1st Am. Ed.), Chap. XII; Reeves Hist. of Eng. Law
(Finlason's Ed.), p. 121; :z Pollock & Maitland Hist. of Eng. Law, 578, 606; 4 Blackstone's Com. *p. 293; Stubbs, Select Charters (:znd Ed.),. 4.26 et seq., 469; I Stephen's
Hist. of Crim. L. 188.
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Here is an important step in the early evolution of criminal law.
It was recognized that an assault was an offense not only against the
man assaulted, but against the state, and though the state was itself
not sufficiently powerful to control the criminals or to apprehend
them after an offense had been committed, it was made the duty of
the constituent parts of the state, the citizens, at their own risk and
cost, to discharge what \Ve now regard as a function of the state,
and to pursue and apprehend and, if necessary, kill the offender.
All law, save as it may include formal regulations of convenience,
such as the law of the road, has a moral element. Arising from
custom and agreement, it embodies that which is generally accepted
to be right. Nations, in the sense that they are governed by international law, are juristic persons, and one may not be a juristic person and free from moral responsibility. International law, like
municipal law, embodies and expresses that which is generally accepted to be right. The international community is just as much
interested in preserving law and order as is a domestic community,
and a violation of international order, of such a flagrant character
as to constitute not only a wrong against another international person, but also an offense against the very stability of the international
order, if it technically cannot be called an international crime, should
arouse, in right-thinking people, the same sense of horror and indignation as are stirred by acts which constitute crime under municipal
law, and to the extent that international society is equipped to cope
with it, it should be treated as crime. I am not aware that history
affords any instance of all other nations or any considerabl~ part of
other nations co-operating in punishing one nation as a criminal, but
it will be recalled that when the commander of the American manof-war removed from the Trent, a British vessel, Messrs. Mason
and Slidell, the Confederate commissioners who were on their way
to England, there was an immediate protest not only from England,
but also from Prussia, Austria and France, and these protests were
not without the suggestion that unless the United States abandoned
the right of search so asserted, war might ensue.16 Here, then, was
the declaration by three great powers that an act which did not affect
them directly might be so dangerous as a precedent that they were
justified in protesting and even threatening. As each individual of
a nation is vitally interested in the preservation of law within his
own country, so every nation is vitally interested in the preservation
of those rules of international law which make for international
:ia

Opening Address of Elihu Root, President of Am. Soc. of Int. Law, April 27,

1916, X Am. Jour. of Int. Law, 217·219.
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safety, and just as in primitive England, because the central power
was weak, the individuals were bound in law to join together in an
effort to apprehend a felon, so, I submit, civilized nations are bound
in law,-as it \Vill be if it is not so now-to join together to arrest
an international criminal. And the fact that the particular offender
is not only a criminal, but an insane ~riminal, does not alter the role.
The people of this country saw this present great war begin and
were under no delusion as to its causes. They knew that Austria
niade a demand upon Serbia to which no self-respecting nation could
yield. They knew that the demand made by Austria was backed
by Germany. They knew that Germany declined the reasonable request of England for a few days' delay. They knew that Germany,
in violation of a treaty to which this country was itself a signatory,17
invaded the territory of poor Belgium, not a party to the quarrel,
and presumably safe within the shelter promised by Germany her7
self. 18 As the war proceeded, we witnessed the occupation of Belgium's territory, the murder of her women and children, the enslavement of her men, the wholesale destruction by starvation of peaceful peasants in Poland, the bloody massacres of unoffending Armenians and the sinking upon the high seas of neutral merchantmen
with their innocent passengers and crews, in violation of common
decency and of every accepted rule; and still we were not moved
to action. With few exceptions and with extraordinary moral obtuseness, our people witnessed these world outrages with indifference. Because we were not attacked on our own soil, our primitive
patriotism was not aroused. When the Lusitania was sunk, and a
thousand or more non-combatants, including helpless women and .
little children, went to their watery graves, indignation was stirred
an~ more people began to feel that this country was or should be '
interested, but still the passion of the country was not inflamed. Not
until there was disclosed Germany's plot to combine with Mexico
and Japan and attack us upon our own territory, not until Germany
at the same time announced her intention to resume her ruthless
submarine policy, did the President feel that the sentiment of the
country was sufficiently awakened to justify him in recommending
to Congress that it recognize a state of war. In his appeal of April
second, however, magnificent address though it is, he stresses particularly the wrongs to our own country and the threat to demo11 Convention V, Second Hague Conference; but see Ed. note, IX American Journal
of International Law, 959.
1STreaty of January 23, 1839, between England, Austria, Russia and Prussia. See
Some Questions of International Law in the European \Var, by James W. Garner; IX
American Journal of International Law, 72.
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cratic institutions. If ever a country had been patient, almost to the
point of cowardice, in endurance of wrongs and repeated wro~gs,
of outrage upon outrage, ours is that country. These offenses
against us were not only adequate, they were compelling, causes of
war-but I could wish that the consciences of our people had been
sufficiently sensitive so that they would have reacted to the higher
motive of national duty.
From nothing I have said would I have it inferred that I have in
mind any criticism of our President or his administration. If I
have felt that the outrages perpetrated by Germany and the philosophy we know is back of them, have proved her an international,
insane criminal, I have also realized that he upon whose shoulders
has rested the grave responsibility of guiding our people, could act
in this great crisis only as he was assured that the conscience and
judgment of the American people were behind him, and with regret
and shame I confess to the belief that there has been no overwhelming moral earnestness in our people which has demanded of their
Government that it should join the international hue and cry. The
tragic offense has been too far away; imaginations are not sufficiently vivid; perhaps, indeed, consciences have not been highly
enough sensitized. With advancing civilization and a greater emphasis upon, and consequent familiarity with, questions of international relations, however, I believe that the .Atµerican people will,
in time, come to realize that they and all peoples who desire justice
are and must be deeply concerned in the prevention of international
crime and the punishment of international criminals.
The League to Enforce Peace is seeking to arouse public opinion
so that at the close of this war a treaty shall be made under which
all civilized powers shall agree that all disputes shall be submitted,
those that are justiciable to a court for decision, and those that are
not justiciable, to a Commission of Conciliation, and that the joint
military and naval forces of the signatories shall be used against any
power which goes to war before submitting such controversy. The
plan has the approval of many of our most thoughtful students of
international law and of many of our leading men in public life,
and has received the endorsement of President Wilson. If adopted, it would, in effect, incorporate in treaty the suggestion I now
make, to the extent, at least, of declaring that an act of war, before
submitting the cause of war to arbitrament, would bring upon the
offender's head the wrath of all other signatory powers. Such a
treaty would be declaratory of what I suggest should be recognized
as international law and of what, I believe, our own country, by its
entrance into the war, has already subconsciously recognized as in-
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ternational law. America has gone into this war not only because
her citizens have been killed on the high seas, not only because her
ships have been sunk, not only because Germany has maintained a
spy-system within our borders 911d has plotted for an attack by our
southern neighbor, but also, in the words of our President, because
"the world must be made safe for d~mocracy," and by that phrase,
I take it, he means that there is a moral purpose in our people which
feels itself in danger of defeat so long as a powerful nation is permitted to commit national murder with impunity. And he intends
to say, further, that the American people are in this war not only
for the defense of their own rights, but in the defense of fundamental and eternal righteousness for all peoples and for all time.
Russia,.in backing up Serbia, may have been actuated to some extent
by purely nationalistic ambitions; France, in joining Russia, may
have been moved in some degree by the requirements of treaties ;
England, in entering the war, may have been guided, in part, by the
belief that prudence required that Germany be kept from occupying
the coast of France and Belgium, but millions of the right-thinking
citizens of these countries felt, too, that they were bound to endure
war not only for their own national interests, but that it might be
established for all time and for all men that Austria could not, at
will, crush her smaller neighbor, nor Germany, at will, trample the
Belgian people into the dust. With our country, now one of the
Allies, national ambitions are pushed to the background, and the war
must proceed for the great moral p~rpose of making it impossible
for this particular offender, at least, ever again to flout the ordinary
decencies. Organized piracy was once driven from the seas by the
co-operation of civilized powers. Brigandage on land should fare
no better.
But there are those who cry aloud, "Tell us what terms of peace
you will make? Tell us what you hope to accomplish?" The man
who stops a huntsman as he raises his gun to shoot at a flying duck
to inquire how he intends to cook the duck when he has shot it, is a
fool. The man who stops the patrol wagon to ask the policemen
what punishment they are going to inflict upon the rioters whom
they are galloping to arrest is worse than a fool-he is an accessory
after the fact. The constabulary of the civilized world is now engaged in catching an insane criminal and it will be time enough to
ask what shall be done with him after he has been. disarmed and
manacled. Terms of settlement- of a civil action may be discussed,
but neither a righteous man nor a righteous nation can compound
a felony.
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As we are gathered here discussing these questions so profoundly
interesting to us, all over our broad land strains of martial music
are quickening the pulse beats of our country's youth. Young men
who almost until today looked forward to normal lives of quiet
professional or business pursuits are already in khaki and scanning
the first pages of their manual of arms. In another month hundreds
of thousands of our best boys will be in training camps, and before
many more months will be on the soil of France, or, perchance, of
Russia. And then, my friends, will come the day of trial. We who
stay behind, only, I hope, because we are unfitted by reason of age
or other infirmity for military service, will scan the daily casualty
list and our hearts will sicken as we learn of loved ones who have
gone to unmarked graves. But as the glaµ10ur of war and the exhilaration of military bands do not now rob of clear vision those
whose convictions are founded in sound and sober thought, so the
day of grief will not avail either to enlarge or to lessen the righteous
indignation of him who loves right because it is right, nor to stay
the flaming sword in the sure, strong hand of Justice. And when
the war is over, be our losses what they may, be our grief more
even then we fear, rest assured that if there has been born into the
world the living principle that a nation stands not only in relations
to each of the other nations, but in relations to the whole, and
that out of that relationship there arises a moral and legal duty to
refrain from crime, and that that duty is one which all are bound to
enforce-be assured, then, I say, that this awful war of untold horror will not have been fought in vain.
CHARLES H. HAMILL..

Chicago.

